

## BUSH ADMINISTRATION, WEAK ON TERROR<sup>1</sup>

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**T**he U.S. public widely credits President Bush with toughness on terror. Most recent polls show more Americans approving than disapproving his handling of the campaign against terror.<sup>2</sup> In fact, the Bush administration is weak on terror. It wages a one-front war against al-Qaeda, the main terror threat, when effort on every relevant front is needed. Specifically, the administration focuses on an offensive military and intelligence campaign abroad while neglecting five other critical fronts: bolstering homeland security, securing weapons and materials of mass destruction from possible theft or purchase by terrorists, winning the war of ideas across the world, ending conflicts that fuel support for al-Qaeda, and saving the failed states where al-Qaeda and like groups can find haven. The administration has also bungled parts of the military offensive by diverting itself into a counterproductive sideshow in Iraq and by alienating potential allies. As a result, al-Qaeda and related jihadi groups remain a potent threat more than five years after the 9/11 attacks.<sup>3</sup> Assessments by U.S. intelligence and other analysts indicate that the terror threat has actually increased since 9/11.<sup>4</sup>

The Bush administration's toughness on terror is an illusion. Its counterterror campaign has been inept and ineffective.<sup>5</sup> President Bush talks the talk of strong action but doesn't walk the walk. And his weakness on terror is putting the United States in great danger.

### **FRONT 1: MILITARY/ INTELLIGENCE**

The Bush administration's counterterror campaign features the use or threat of force to destroy or coerce regimes that shelter al-Qaeda, and the use of intelligence and police work to destroy al-Qaeda's global organization. The centerpiece of this offensive was the 2001 smashing of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had sheltered al-Qaeda. This important success denied al-Qaeda access to training bases and isolated al-Qaeda leaders from their global network.

Other elements of the Bush offensive were less successful. The Bush team bungled the battle of Tora Bora in Afghanistan in December 2001, allowing Osama bin Laden and other top al-Qaeda leaders to escape.<sup>6</sup> Then it bungled Operation Anaconda in March 2002, again allowing important al-Qaeda elements to escape.<sup>7</sup> Then it offered far too little economic and security

assistance to the new Afghan government of Hamid Karzai. As a result, al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies have reestablished a strong presence in southern and eastern Afghanistan and in nearby Pakistan. This endangers all the gains won by ousting the Taliban in 2001-02. Al-Qaeda is again gaining access to the sanctuaries it needs to train its killers.

The weakness of the Bush administration's offensive against al-Qaeda stems partly from the administration's decision to attack Iraq in 2003. The Iraq War consumed resources needed to battle al-Qaeda.<sup>8</sup> For example, Operation Anaconda failed partly because the Bush team withheld needed forces for the coming war in Iraq.<sup>9</sup> In warfare one should concentrate first on the most dangerous threat. Al-Qaeda posed a far greater threat than Saddam's Iraq and should have taken top priority. Although the Bush administration has implied otherwise, Saddam and al-Qaeda had no operational ties and did not work in concert against the United States.<sup>10</sup> Hence, ousting Saddam was a diversion from the war against al-Qaeda.

Even worse, the Iraq War strengthened al-Qaeda by inflaming the Muslim world against the United States. Al-Qaeda propaganda has exploited TV images of American troops fighting Muslim Iraqis, alleging that they show the United States is trying to destroy Islam. The counterinsurgent character of the U.S. intervention has made this propaganda especially effective. Counterinsurgency is inherently cruel and presents a grim spectacle to onlookers. By falling into the role of counterinsurgent in Iraq, the Bush administration has damaged America's position far beyond Iraq and given al-Qaeda a big boost.<sup>11</sup>

The Bush administration also squandered valuable Syrian cooperation against al-Qaeda by its confrontational stance toward Damascus. After 9/11, the Syrian government shared intelligence with Washington that allowed the United States to thwart al-Qaeda attacks on the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain and on the U.S. embassy in Ottawa, Canada.<sup>12</sup> The Bush administration's hostility toward Syria has ended this cooperation.

Thus even on the offensive, its favored mission, the Bush team has botched key operations and failed to stay focused on key objectives.

## **FRONT 2: DEFENSE**

The Bush administration's homeland defense effort contains large holes.<sup>13</sup> The FBI remains focused on crime solving, not terror prevention.<sup>14</sup> Local law enforcement, a front line in the war, has not been fully engaged in the struggle against terror. The U.S. government still has no single, coordinated national watch list of terror suspects. Such a basic tool is essential to counterterrorism. Yet the United States instead maintains several different watch lists, feeding confusion among security personnel on the front lines.<sup>15</sup>

U.S. nuclear reactors and chemical plants remain vulnerable and inviting targets for terrorists. Clever attacks on these reactors and plants could kill tens of thousands or more. U.S. ports remain open to devastating attack. U.S. biodefenses have been strengthened, but the United States remains vulnerable to bioterror. The U.S. food supply remains vulnerable to attack. U.S. insurance laws governing terror give businesses little incentive to harden their infrastructure. U.S. borders remain essentially open.

The CIA has been damaged by a campaign against employees who were deemed unfriendly to the Bush administration. This campaign caused an exodus of able officers from the CIA.<sup>16</sup>

This situation reflects the administration's decision to focus on offensive efforts while doing only enough on homeland security to give the appearance of action. At this point, homeland security is more a palliative to public fear than a real security program.

### FRONT 3: SECURING WMD

Vast nuclear and biological weapons and materials remain poorly secured in the former Soviet

Union and elsewhere. Enough nuclear materials are poorly secured in Russia and other countries to make tens of thousands of Hiroshima-sized atomic bombs. Many Russian nuclear and biological-weap-

ons scientists also are underpaid or unemployed, ripe for hiring by terrorists. Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have all failed to move decisively to lock down these materials and scientists. The United States spends only around \$1.3 billion per year on the project (through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative [CTR]) and will not complete it for years.<sup>17</sup> The CTR program lacks a strong, visible leader who can make things happen in Washington and Moscow. Amazingly, in the two years after 9/11, no

more loose nuclear weapons and materials were secured than in the two prior years — a testament to the Bush administration's inattention.<sup>18</sup> Duck and cover! This policy lapse is among the worst failures of government in modern times.<sup>19</sup>

Funding for CTR should be tripled, and a strong political figure — a James Baker type — should be put in charge. The president should empower this leader to use the full array of American carrots and sticks to get results from foreign governments.

The North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs pose another danger. North Korea now has six to eight atomic bombs

and is making enough plutonium to build another one or two bombs per year, with more capacity on the way. Iran will achieve a bomb-making capacity in a few years.

These bombs could be acquired by terrorists through purchase or theft.

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Both North Korea and Iran have at different times signaled a willingness to deal away their nuclear programs for the right terms.<sup>20</sup> The Bush administration should respond by marshaling all its carrots and sticks, as well as its allies' carrots and sticks, to persuade North Korea and Iran to change course.

Yet the Bush team has not put important rewards or credible focused threats on the table. Instead it talks in general terms of regime change, a provocation that sharpens the appetite for nuclear weapons in both

Tehran and Pyongyang. The Bush policy amounts to wishing for regime change, but not causing it, as a substitute for seeking a deal that advances U.S. security. This is magical thinking, not national-security policy. The failure of the Bush policy toward North Korea and Iran is manifest, and very dangerous. Nuclear weapons built as a result could someday reach the hands of terrorists and then U.S. cities.

#### **FRONT 4: IDEAS**

To defeat al-Qaeda and its jihadi allies, the United States must change the terms of debate in the Arab/Muslim world. Al-Qaeda finds recruits and safe havens because much of the Arab/Muslim public accepts its narrative. It will remain strong until that narrative is answered and discredited. The al-Qaeda narrative is a farrago of historical fabrications and half-truths. It portrays the last century as a period of vast unprovoked one-way violence by the United States and other non-Muslim states against a benign Muslim world that was innocent of wrongdoing. If this narrative were true, it would indeed justify Muslim rage. The crimes of the West would cry out for a punishing response.

But violence between Muslims and non-Muslims has in fact been a two-way street. Neither side can claim a clear grievance against the other based on history. Western states have committed great cruelties against Muslim societies. These include horrific barbarism by France, Britain and Italy in their efforts from 1840 to 1962 to subdue colonies in Algeria, Libya, Iraq and elsewhere; the 1953 U.S. coup in Iran; and a cynical U.S. policy toward Afghanistan from 1989 to 1992 that left the country in flames.

On the other hand, Muslim Sudan's government has slaughtered two million non-Muslim South Sudanese since 1983, and it supported the murderous Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda. Muslim Indonesia murdered 200,000 Christian East Timorese from 1975 to 2000 and 400,000-500,000 of its non-Muslim Chinese minority in 1965. Muslim Turkey massacred 600,000 - 1,500,000 Christian Armenians in 1895 and 1915, in one of the great genocides of modern times.<sup>21</sup> Thus the recent history of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims is marred by crimes on both sides. Both should confess, hang their heads in shame and ask forgiveness. Both have disqualified themselves by their own egregious misconduct from making claims against the other.

Muslim extremists also have much Muslim blood on their own hands. Their crimes include the slaughter of several hundred thousand Muslims in Darfur by Sudan's Islamist government since 2003, the killing of many thousand Afghan Muslims by the Islamist Taliban during its bloody rule, the killing of tens of thousands of Algerian Muslims by the violent Algerian Islamist movement called the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) from 1992 to 1998, and the killing of thousands of Iraqi Shia by Sunni jihadis in Iraq since 2003. These crimes put the lie to the extremists' claims of concern for the welfare of fellow Muslims. The extremists should atone for these crimes before seeking vengeance for the crimes of others against Muslims.

Some of the Western crimes cited by al-Qaeda and other jihadis are invented. In their narrative, the U.S. interventions in Somalia (1992-94), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999) are painted as violent predations against Muslim populations.

This portrayal grossly distorts the historical record. The United States committed serious mistakes in these interventions but it intervened in each case to assist Muslims, not to harm them. Its intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo ended Serb violence against those Muslim-majority populations, and its intervention in Somalia saved over 40,000 Muslim Somali lives.<sup>22</sup>

In short, the al-Qaeda narrative leaves much to debate and correct. Muslim rage would be deflated if Muslims understood this. But Bush administration efforts to correct the record are half-hearted. The books, articles and media products one would expect to be produced in a serious war of ideas are not appearing. Missing are films of interviews with the hundreds of African victims maimed by al-Qaeda's 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Missing are documentaries on the murderous cruelty of the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the Islamist government in Sudan against their Muslim citizens. A few film makers could make these quickly, but the administration is not interested.

As a result, malignant misperceptions persist in the Muslim world. For example, large majorities in Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan and Indonesia still do not believe that groups of Arabs carried out the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States.<sup>23</sup> U.S. efforts to destroy al-Qaeda cannot succeed while such attitudes endure.

U.S. public diplomacy is failing because the Bush team has put only scant resources into it. In FY 2003, the U.S. government spent only some \$1.14 billion on the public-diplomacy function;<sup>24</sup> in FY 2006, it spent only about \$1.36 billion.<sup>25</sup> Only \$150 million of the State Department's FY 2003 public-diplomacy money was

spent in Muslim-majority countries.<sup>26</sup> These are paltry sums relative to the task at hand.

This failure, in turn, reflects the Bush administration's macho approach to foreign policy. It believes that friends abroad are won by using the mailed fist. Allies are gained by instilling fear, not respect. The Caligula theory of statecraft — "let them hate us as long as they fear us" — is believed and applied. Reasoning with others is assumed to be pointless, as others are immoral cowards who understand only the threat of force. Public diplomacy is for wimps. This schoolyard bully attitude has led the administration to neglect the war of ideas. The United States has powerful skills of persuasion, but the Bush team has failed to use them.<sup>27</sup>

Will the Muslim world engage in debate about historical truth? Will it agree that it must rest its claims on valid history? The Quran says it must: "Believers, if an evil-doer brings you a piece of news, inquire first into its truth, lest you should wrong others unwittingly and then regret your action."<sup>28</sup> The United States should embrace this teaching and propose that both sides abide by it. This would require that both agree to enquire about and debate the truth of history.

## **FRONT 5: ENDING CONFLICTS**

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict inflames Arabs and Muslims against the United States.<sup>29</sup> Al-Qaeda exploits the conflict with great success in its propaganda. Hence, the United States must move credibly to end it. To move toward peace, Washington should frame its own final-status peace plan and use carrots and sticks to persuade both sides to agree. This will put the opponents of peace on

both sides on the defensive. Most important, it will corner the radical Palestinian group Hamas by exposing its extremism as an obstacle to a just peace.

Most Palestinians now want a compromise peace with Israel involving a two-state solution. More militant Palestinians, including Hamas, who reject peace with Israel, have nevertheless maintained their popular support by arguing that a two-state solution was never in the cards, so their extremism does not prevent peace and thus does no harm. The United States can destroy their argument by making clear that it will lead matters to just such a peace if the two sides will cooperate. Hamas will then be forced to bend toward peace or lose power.

The U.S. final-status plan should involve a nearly complete Israeli withdrawal in exchange for full and final peace, in line with the four major peace plans that have been widely discussed in recent years: the Clinton bridging proposals of December 2000, the Abdullah Plan of March 2002, and the Geneva accord and the Ayalon-Nusseibeh initiative, both of December 2003. Polls show majorities on both sides favoring the terms of these proposals. This gives the United States a lot to work with if it wants to push Israeli-Palestinian peace forward.

Washington should also move to dampen other conflicts in the Mideast and

Muslim worlds. Al-Qaeda feeds on war. It exploits any strife involving Muslims anywhere in the world by painting them as victims — whether or not they are — and publicizing their suffering. It exploits in this fashion current wars in Kashmir and Chechnya and past wars in Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian war. Accordingly, the United States should have a policy of dampening conflict and promoting peace in Kashmir

and Chechnya as well as Israel-Palestine. As al-Qaeda feeds on war, so the United States should be the great maker and builder of peace in the region.<sup>30</sup>

The Bush administration has done little to promote peace. For Israel-Palestine, it has offered

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no final-status peace plan. It did offer a general roadmap toward final-status negotiations in 2003 but failed to press the two sides to implement it. It did little to bolster the power of the moderate Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas after he won election in January 2005, a failure that set the stage for the Hamas victory in parliamentary elections in January 2006. It failed to exploit Abbas's election by pressing to restart Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Overall it has been almost inert. Nor did it press for peace in Kashmir or Chechnya.

## **FRONT 6: FAILED STATES**

Al-Qaeda and other terror groups grow and thrive in failed states, using them as havens in which they can establish secure bases to mass-produce trained, motivated killers. Al-Qaeda grew into a monster in the 1990s because it found haven in Afghanistan, where it trained thousands of terrorists. Failed states therefore pose a grave threat to U.S. national security. Preventing or resuscitating such states should have high priority. They are far more dangerous to the United States than authoritarian states such as Iraq under Saddam or Syria under the Asads.

In contrast, the Bush administration believes that only state-sponsored terrorists can do real harm to the United States, so it sees the hostile authoritarian states that might sponsor terror as more dangerous than failed states. Accordingly, the administration has focused its counterterror efforts on coercing or ousting hostile authoritarian regimes like Saddam's or the Asads'. Before taking office, Bush team members poured scorn on the nation-building activities of the Clinton administration and vowed not to continue them. In office, they have not addressed state failures in the Mideast region. As a result failed states have proliferated dangerously. Five failed or semi-failed states in the Middle East now pose a danger: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Lebanon and Iraq. All are failing partly because the Bush administration has done little to sustain them.

As noted above, the administration made only half-hearted efforts to stabilize Afghanistan after it ousted the Taliban regime in 2001-02. Needed security and economic aid were not provided. As a result, al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies have re-established a strong presence in south-

ern and eastern Afghanistan. Nearby Pakistan remains unstable and cannot police its Northwest Frontier Province. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have free run of the area. Al-Qaeda uses this base to plot mayhem across the world; the Taliban exploits it to attack into Afghanistan. Thus, Afghanistan is failing partly because its neighbor Pakistan is already semi-failed, an illustration that state failure can be dangerously contagious. Yet the Bush administration has no program to bring order and moderation to Pakistan, as Pakistani dictator Pervez Musharraf is friendly to the United States — never mind that he cannot govern his country and that the regions he cannot control are a terrorist cauldron.

In Somalia, radical Islamists with ties to al-Qaeda have gained control of Mogadishu after defeating U.S.-backed warlords in June 2006; civil war looms. Yet the administration has no apparent program to bring order to Somalia. In Lebanon, the administration did little to build up the Lebanese state or army after Syrian forces were pushed out in 2005. This left Hizbollah with a secure sanctuary in south Lebanon, which it exploited to attack Israel in July 2006, sparking the Israel-Lebanon war. Finally, the administration has caused state failure in Iraq by invading and then bungling the occupation. The global jihadi movement is now using Iraq as an effective rallying cry and training ground. Saddam's authoritarian regime was dangerous; failed Iraq is an even greater danger.

These state failures are a boon to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, which will find haven in these states and build themselves up accordingly. To address this danger, the Bush administration should shift its focus from changing regimes to building

nations. No such shift seems to be on the administration agenda, however.

### **NEEDED: POLICY INNOVATION**

Winning the war on terror will require major innovations in U.S. national-security policy. The United States should put relatively fewer resources into traditional military functions — army, navy, air force — and far more into counterterror functions. These include intelligence, homeland security, WMD diplomacy, public diplomacy, diplomacy to end conflicts that breed terror — including the Israeli-Arab dispute and the conflicts in Kashmir and Chechnya — and building nations and saving failed states in order to deny terrorists the shelter they need to build their organizations. But the organizations that carry out these functions are politically weak in Washington, so they lose out in the budget battles. And, like all governments, the U.S. government resists innovation, so the changes needed to defeat al-Qaeda face large political obstacles. Can the U.S. government innovate to the extent required?

Americans should want to hear the pulling and hauling of vast turf fights in Washington. This would tell them that resources and authority were being transferred from yesterday's Cold War-oriented agencies to counterterror-oriented agencies. Instead the tenor of national-security policy in Washington is largely business as usual. The Bush administration is not leading innovation forward.

The agencies that would lead in a serious war on al-Qaeda still take a back seat to the military. Specifically, in 2006 the United States spent \$454 billion for the military services and their support.<sup>31</sup> Meanwhile it spent only \$40 billion on homeland security.<sup>32</sup> And, as noted above,

in 2006, the United States spent only \$1.31 billion on locking down loose nuclear weapons and materials through the CTR and \$1.36 billion on public diplomacy. Thus, U.S. military spending was 11 times as great as U.S. spending on homeland security, 347 times U.S. spending on locking down nuclear weapons and materials, and 334 times U.S. spending on the war of ideas. Like a midget with a strong right arm, the United States is powerful in one regard, but only one.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, which frames the plan for future U.S. military programs, is little changed from the Cold War period. It still recommends spending vast sums on ultra-high-tech tactical fighters and killer submarines that now have no enemy to fight and little role against al-Qaeda.<sup>33</sup> The innovation that victory against al-Qaeda requires is not underway.

### **MIA: A STRONG COUNTERTERROR POLICY**

Before the 9/11 al-Qaeda attack, the Bush administration took the terror threat lightly. In January 2001, it downgraded the government's chief counterterror officer, the national coordinator for counter terrorism, to a non-cabinet-level position.<sup>34</sup> The president's deputy secretary of defense, Paul Wolfowitz, belittled the al-Qaeda threat in April 2001, only five months before the 9/11 attack, wondering in a meeting "why we are beginning by talking about this one man, Bin Laden," and offering the grossly incorrect assertion that Iraq was at least as active in terrorism as the al-Qaeda mastermind.<sup>35</sup> President Bush himself dismissed a CIA briefer who warned in August 2001 of an impending al-Qaeda attack, telling him, "You've covered



your ass, now.”<sup>36</sup> When marked indications of a terror attack were detected in early summer 2001, the administration failed to call the government to alert status — unlike the Clinton administration, which called a government alert in late 1999 on receiving warning of the al-Qaeda millennium plot (which it thwarted).<sup>37</sup> In fact, the administration failed even to hold a meeting of cabinet principals to consider the terror threat until September 4, 2001, despite urgent pleas for such a meeting beginning in January 2001 from Richard Clarke, the national coordinator for counterterrorism.<sup>38</sup>

Although the 9/11 attack should have shaken the administration out of its torpor

toward terror, the syndrome persists. The administration talks tough but does little. Instead the United States should be working full-throttle to defeat al-Qaeda. This requires action on every relevant front in addition to major policy innovations. The United States should also refrain from further diversions from the campaign against the main enemy, the al-Qaeda network and other jihadi terrorists. In the first instance, a military confrontation with Syria or Iran, urged by some in Washington, should be avoided. This would be a major distraction, or worse. Al-Qaeda is the greatest danger we face, and defeating it must be our top priority.

<sup>1</sup> This article is adapted from: Stephen Van Evera, “Assessing U.S. Strategy in the War on Terror,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 607, No. 1 (September 2006): pp.10-26. DOI: 10.1177/0002716206291492.

<sup>2</sup> Five of the six *The New York Times*/CBS News national polls taken since June 2006 showed pluralities approving of President Bush’s handling of the campaign against terror. *The New York Times* CBS News Poll, October 5-8, 2006, retrieved from [http://graphics.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/20061010\\_poll\\_results.pdf](http://graphics.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/20061010_poll_results.pdf) on 10/17/06.

<sup>3</sup> A portrait of the jihadis’ violent worldview is Mary Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror* (Yale University Press, 2006).

<sup>4</sup> Mark Mazzetti, “Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terrorism Threat,” *The New York Times*, September 24, 2006: p. A1; and David Sanger, “Waging the War on Terror: Report Belies Optimistic View,” *The New York Times*, September 27, 2006: p. A6.

<sup>5</sup> Valuable assessments of Bush administration counterterror policies include Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror* (Free Press, 2004): pp. 227-287; Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War against America* (Random House, 2003): pp. 447-488; and Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting It Right* (Times Books, 2005). Valuable assessments of the Bush administration’s broader performance in foreign policy and national security include Carl Conetta, “Pyrrhus on the Potomac: How America’s post-9/11 Wars Have Undermined US National Security” (Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Report #18, September 5, 2006, retrieved from [www.comw.org/pda/](http://www.comw.org/pda/)); Sharon Burke and Harlan Geer, “The Neo Con: The Bush Defense Record by the Numbers” (Third Way National Security Project, September 2006, retrieved from [www.third-way.com](http://www.third-way.com)); Flynt Leverett, “Illusion and Reality,” *American Prospect Online* (September 12, 2006, retrieved from <http://www.prospect.org/web/printfriendly-view.wv?id=11859>); and Lawrence Korb and Caroline Wadhams, “A Critique of the Bush Administration National Security Strategy” (The Stanley Foundation, Policy Analysis Brief: June 2006; retrieved from <http://reports.stanleyfoundation.org>).

<sup>6</sup> An account is Peter Krause, “Tora Bora: Assessing the Conventional Wisdom” (manuscript, May 2006).

<sup>7</sup> An account of Operation Anaconda is Sean Naylor, *Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda* (Berkley Books, 2005).

<sup>8</sup> Arguing that the Iraq War diverted important resources from the war on al-Qaeda and from other important priorities is James Fallows, “Bush’s Lost Year,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, October 2004.

<sup>9</sup> Naylor, *Not a Good Day to Die*: pp. 85-86; and Gary C. Schroen, *First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan* (Presidio Press, 2005): pp. 359-60.

<sup>10</sup> See *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, authorized ed. (W.W. Norton, 2004):p. 66, reporting that the 9/11 Commission found “no evidence” of a “collaborative operational relationship” between Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda. Debunking more recent false allegations of Saddam-al-Qaeda ties is Peter Bergen, “Enemy of our Enemy,” *The New York Times*, March 28, 2006.

<sup>11</sup> The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies reports that al-Qaeda’s recruiting was accelerated by the U.S. invasion of Iraq, swelling al-Qaeda’s ranks to some 18,000 in the aftermath of the war. *International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey: 2003/4* (IISS, 2004): p. 6. An April 2006 U.S. intelligence estimate concurs that the Iraq War has fueled the spread of the jihadi ideology. Mazzetti, “Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terrorism Threat.”

<sup>12</sup> Seymour Hersh, “The Syrian Bet,” *The New Yorker*, July 28, 2003; and William James Martin, “Clean Break with the Road Map,” *Counterpunch*, February 14/15, 2004: pp. 12-14.

<sup>13</sup> Valuable surveys on homeland security include Stephen Flynn, *America the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism* (HarperCollins, 2004); and Clarke, *Against All Enemies*: pp. 247-262.

<sup>14</sup> The 9/11 Public Discourse Project, the nonprofit successor organization to the 9/11 Commission, reported in October 2005 that the FBI had failed to reform itself to address the terror threat. Philip Shenon, “9/11 Panel Criticizes Reform Effort at the F.B.I.,” *The New York Times*, October 21, 2005: p. A19. In March 2005, the WMD Commission likewise complained that the FBI has made “insufficient progress” in areas crucial to recasting itself as a counterterror agency. Eric Lichtblau, “For F.B.I., Not Enough Progress in Combating Terrorism,” *The New York Times*, April 1, 2005: p. A11. For example, remarkably the FBI remains unable to develop software to link its case files (*ibid.*). It has also been unable to provide stable leadership to head its counterterror mission. In early 2006, the FBI counterterror division was on its sixth director since 2001. See Scott Shane, “Year into Revamped Spying, Troubles and Some Progress,” *The New York Times*, February 28, 2006: p. A12. Instead the common practice at the FBI has been to punish employees who point out shortcomings with the FBI’s performance. One report notes that “a string of whistle-blowers at the [F.B.I.] ... said they had been punished and effectively silenced for voicing concerns about the handling of terror investigations and other matters since Sept. 11, 2001.” Eric Lichtblau, “Justice Department Investigators Find a Cover-Up in an F.B.I. Terror Case in Florida,” *The New York Times*, December 4, 2005: Section 1, p. 37.

<sup>15</sup> Stephen E. Flynn, “Q&A: Homeland Security: Disturbing Lack of Attention Paid to America’s Security Vulnerabilities,” *nytimes.com*, December 24, 2005, retrieved from [www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot2\\_122405.html?pagewanted=print](http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot2_122405.html?pagewanted=print), p. 2.

<sup>16</sup> Thomas Friedman, “Saying No to Bush’s Yes Men,” *The New York Times*, May 17, 2006: p. A23. See also Thomas Powers, “Spy vs. Spy,” *The New York Times*, May 10, 2006: p. A23; and Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti, “Top C.I.A. Pick Has Credentials and Skeptics,” *The New York Times*, May 6, 2006: p. A1. According to Shane, “Year Into Revamped Spying,” former and current U.S. officials warn that U.S. intelligence agencies “remain troubled by high-level turnover, overlapping responsibilities, and bureaucratic rivalry.”

<sup>17</sup> The United States spent only \$1.312 billion on the CTR in fiscal year 2006. Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, *Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives* (Project on Managing the Atom, 2005): p. 86, Table 4-8.

<sup>18</sup> Bunn and Wier, *Securing the Bomb 2005*: p. vi.

<sup>19</sup> On U.S. policy toward nuclear materials security, see Graham Allison, *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe* (Times Books, 2004): pp. 143-50, 177; Bunn and Wier, *Securing the Bomb 2005*; Graham Allison, “Making America Safer from Nuclear Terrorism,” in Stephen Van Evera, ed., *How To Make America Safe: New Policies for National Security* (Tobin Project, 2006; available online at [www.makeamericasafe.org](http://www.makeamericasafe.org)): pp. 3-11; Matthew Bunn, “Preventing a Nuclear 9/11,” in *ibid.*: pp. 13-22; and resources at the Nuclear Threat Initiative web site ([www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org)) and the Managing the Atom web site ([www.managingtheatom.org](http://www.managingtheatom.org)).

<sup>20</sup> Iran’s signals of its willingness to agree to curb its nuclear program are summarized in Flynt Leverett, “Iran: The Gulf between Us,” *The New York Times*, January 24, 2006; and in Leverett: “Bush Administration ‘Not Serious’ about Dealing With Iran,” interview by Bernard Gwertzman with Flynt Leverett, March 31, 2006, Council on Foreign Relations, retrieved from [www.cfr.org/publication/10326/](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10326/) on 9/6/06. North Korea’s signals

are discussed in Jim Walsh, "Trip Report: DPRK, PRC, ROK, June 25-July 4, 2005" (Managing the Atom Project, BCSIA, Harvard University, n.d.): 4-5, 7-9, 11-13 and passim.

<sup>21</sup> A 1994 study of genocide estimated that 1.4 million Armenians were murdered between 1914-1918 by the Ottoman Turkish government. See Rudolph J. Rummel, "Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (February 1994): pp. 1-10. A good introduction to this genocide is Benjamin A. Valentino, *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century* (Cornell University Press, 2004): pp. 157-166.

<sup>22</sup> On Somalia see Taylor Seybolt, "Knights in Shining Armor? When Humanitarian Military Intervention Works and When It Does Not," (Ph.D. dissertation. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999): pp. 15-17, 115-211. Seybolt estimates that more than 44,000 Somali lives were saved by U.S. action at the cost of some 1,000-1,500 Somalis killed by western forces. *Ibid.*: pp. 15-17.

<sup>23</sup> "The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other," *Pew Global Attitudes Project*, June 12, 2006, question 38; retrieved from <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=253>. Disbelievers that Arabs performed the 9/11 attack outnumbered believers by 59 to 32 percent in Egypt, 59 to 16 percent in Turkey, 65 to 16 percent in Indonesia, and 41 to 16 percent in Pakistan. *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Steven R. Weisman, "U.S. Must Counteract Image in Muslim World, Panel Says," *The New York Times*, October 1, 2003. This figure includes \$600 million spent by the State Department on its worldwide public diplomacy activities and \$540 million spent by the Broadcasting Board of Governors on broadcasts.

<sup>25</sup> U.S. Congressional Research Service, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and the 9/11 Commission Recommendations* (RL32607; May 1, 2006), by Susan B. Epstein; 5, estimated from Figure 1. Accessed on 5/30/06 at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/66505.pdf>.

<sup>26</sup> Weisman, "U.S. Must Counteract Image in Muslim World."

<sup>27</sup> Further wisdom on persuading other societies to cooperate with U.S. policies is found in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (Public Affairs, 2004).

<sup>28</sup> God in *The Holy Qur'an: Text, Translation and Commentary by Abdullah Yusuf Ali* (Tahrike Tarsile Qur'an, 2001, first ed. 1934): 49:6. A similar verse is: "Do not confound the truth with falsehood, nor knowingly conceal the truth." God in *The Koran*, trans. N.J. Dawood (Penguin, 1999): 2:42. Also relevant is God's prohibition of undue suspicion of others: "Believers, avoid immoderate suspicion, for in some cases suspicion is a crime." God in *ibid.*: 49:12.

<sup>29</sup> I summarize poll data on the harmful impact of the Israel-Palestinian conflict on Arab opinion toward the United States in Stephen Van Evera, "Vital Interest: Winning the War on Terror Requires a Mideast Peace Settlement," *The American Conservative*, Vol. 4, No. 5 (March 14, 2005): pp. 7-10 at 7-8. A footnoted version is online at [http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit\\_5\\_05\\_VanEvera.pdf](http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit_5_05_VanEvera.pdf).

<sup>30</sup> My argument is from Stephanie Kaplan, who argues in a forthcoming MIT political science Ph.D. dissertation that war is a tonic for terrorist propaganda-making, recruiting, network-building, and training, and thus serves as a general breeding ground for terrorists. She concludes that war prevention and war termination should be a centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

<sup>31</sup> Miriam Pemberton and Lawrence Korb, *A Unified Security Budget for the United States, 2007* (Foreign Policy in Focus, May 3, 2006, retrieved from [www.fpiif.org/fpiftxt/3253](http://www.fpiif.org/fpiftxt/3253)): 6, Chart 4. Pemberton and Korb report that total U.S. spending on national defense (the 050 federal budget account) in 2006 was \$463 billion. Of this, \$8 billion went to non-military security assistance and about \$1 billion went to counterproliferation activities, including CTR. The remaining \$454 went to the military services and their support. See also Cindy Williams, "Budgets to Make America Safer," in Van Evera, ed., *How To Make America Safe*: p. 61-67 at 64, Table 1 (also available online at [www.makeamericasafe.org](http://www.makeamericasafe.org)).

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* This figure omits spending on security for Defense Department installations in the United States.

<sup>33</sup> Fred Kaplan, "Rumsfeld Surrenders: The QDR Dashes His Dreams of Military Transformation," *Slate*, February 3, 2006, retrieved from [www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2135343](http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2135343).

<sup>34</sup> Clarke, *Against All Enemies*: p. 230.

<sup>35</sup> Clarke, *Against All Enemies*: pp. 231-32.

<sup>36</sup> Ron Suskind, *The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11* (Simon and Schuster, 2006): p. 2.

<sup>37</sup> Clarke, *Against All Enemies*: pp. 205-214.

<sup>38</sup> Clarke, *Against All Enemies*: p. 237.